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ABSTRACT
Understanding citizens’ electoral behavior (e.g., selective abstention and split-
ticket voting), represents a fundamental step in the analysis of democratic insti-
tutions. In this paper, we assess the extent to which sincere voting can explain
observed patterns of participation and voting in U.S. national elections. We
propose a uniﬁed model of turnout and voting in presidential and congressional
elections with heterogenous voters. We estimate the model using individual-
level data for eight presidential election years (1972-2000). Our main ﬁndings
can be summarized as follows. First, a non-negligible fraction of the American
electorate does not vote sincerely, and only a relatively small fraction of ob-
served split-ticket voting can be explained by sincere voting. Second, there is a
systematic, positive relationship between information and turnout. Third, the
American electorate has become relatively more polarized over time.
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Voting is a cornerstone of democracy and citizens’ participation and voting decisions in
elections are fundamental inputs of the political process that shapes the policies adopted by
democratic societies. Hence, understanding observed patterns of electoral turnout and voting
represents a fundamental step in the political-economy analysis of democratic institutions.
Two prominent features emerge from data on U.S. national elections in presidential elec-
tion years.1 First, many citizens do not vote at all, and some “selectively abstain” (that is,
they vote in one election but not in the other).2 Second, often people vote a “split ticket”
(that is, they vote for candidates of diﬀerent parties for President and for Congress). Can
these observed phenomena be the natural outcomes of the aggregation of individual deci-
sions of citizens with heterogeneous ideological preferences? Or, in other words, to what
extent can “sincere voting” account for observed patterns of participation and voting in U.S.
national elections?
In this paper, we propose a systematic way to address these questions empirically. To
achieve our goal, we propose a uniﬁed (spatial) model of turnout and voting in presiden-
tial and congressional elections, which we estimate using individual-level data for each U.S.
presidential election year after 1970 (that is, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and
2000). Our analysis incorporates several important dimensions of (observed and unobserved)
heterogeneity among citizens. First of all, while the presidential election is nation-wide (that
is, all citizens face the same set of candidates regardless of where they reside), congressional
elections are held at the district level, so that citizens residing in diﬀerent congressional dis-
tricts face diﬀerent sets of candidates. Citizens also diﬀer with respect to their demographic
characteristics and party aﬃliation. In addition, they may also diﬀer along several unob-
served attributes, like their ideological positions, their level of information about electoral
candidates and their “type,” where we distinguish between citizens who are “sincere” or
1In the United States, citizens are called to participate in national elections to elect the President and
the members of Congress. While congressional elections occur every two years, the time between presidential
elections is four years. We refer to an election year where both presidential and congressional elections occur
simultaneously as a presidential election year.
2Typically, more people vote for President than for Congress.
1“contrarian.”
We model the behavior of a sincere citizen as the solution to a two-stage optimization
problem, where in each election, the citizen ﬁrst chooses whether to participate or to ab-
stain, and then conditional on participating decides who to vote for. Since we consider an
environment where citizens may be uncertain about candidates’ positions and may therefore
vote for the “wrong” candidate, our theory of turnout and voting is based on the premise
that sincere citizens minimize their expected regret.
In our analysis, however, we also allow for the possibility that some citizens may make
voting decisions that are inconsistent with this optimization problem. We refer to these
citizens as “contrarian voters”. Consistent with our main objective of quantifying the extent
to which sincere voting can explain the data, we do not model the behavior of contrarian
voters. Instead, we simply mechanically deﬁne contrarian voting as a residual category of
behavior (that is, all instances of “deviations” from sincere voting), and ask what fractions
of the observations (if any) fall within this category.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. We ﬁnd that between 1972 and 2000,
the aggregate proportion of sincere citizens ranges from 82% to 93%. This implies that in
every presidential election year a non-negligible fraction of the American electorate does not
vote sincerely. More importantly, only a relatively small fraction (about 20% on average) of
observed split-ticket voting can be explained by sincere voting in any given year, although
this fraction has increased over time. We conclude that sincere voting alone cannot explain
split-ticket voting. Other factors play an important role in citizens’ decisions to split their
vote in presidential and congressional elections.3
For each presidential election year, our empirical analysis generates estimates of the distri-
butions of citizens’ positions on the liberal-conservative ideological space, and the probability
citizens are informed about electoral candidates. We ﬁnd that citizens’ demographic charac-
teristics are systematically related both to their ideological positions and to their probability
of being informed in interesting ways. For example, individuals with relatively low levels
of education (i.e., without a high school degree), and individuals with relatively high lev-
3These factors may include equilibrium eﬀects as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and Chari, Jones and
Marimon (1997).
2els of education (i.e., with at least a college degree), are systematically more liberal than
individuals with intermediate levels of education. Also, while in the 1970s women are less
informed than men, in the 1980s and 1990s they become more informed than men. Overall,
we ﬁnd that while the 1970s are characterized by a process of relative convergence in citizens’
ideological positions, this tendency is reversed in the two decades that follow, leading to a
polarization of the American electorate.4
Our model implies a relationship between information and turnout. Since uninformed
citizens are more likely to make “voting mistakes” and hence have larger expected regret from
voting, they abstain more than informed citizens. Our analysis also provides an explanation
for the fact that, in every presidential election year, we always observe more abstention in
congressional elections than in the presidential election, and some selective abstention. Our
estimates imply that the average regret from abstaining in the presidential election is always
smaller than in a congressional election (or, in other words, citizens ﬁnd it relatively more
costly to make voting mistakes in the presidential election than in a congressional election).
This result alone would lead to relatively more abstention in the presidential election. At the
same time, however, our estimates also imply that the average expected regret from voting
in the presidential election is always smaller than in a congressional election, and the second
eﬀect (which is due to the fact that, in general, there is more information, and hence less
uncertainty, about presidential candidates than congressional candidates), always dominates.
Finally, we use the estimated model to evaluate the eﬀects of three counterfactual exper-
iments on electoral outcomes. In particular, for each presidential election year, we analyze
the outcomes of presidential and congressional elections under three hypothetical scenarios
where: (i) all citizens are sincere; (ii) all citizens are informed; and (iii) all citizens vote. Our
analysis predicts that each of these three scenarios would lower the probability of divided
government (that is, a situation where one party controls the presidency while the other
party controls the majority of Congress).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the rela-
4McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) document the existence of similar
patterns for members of Congress.
5For an interesting analysis of divided government in post-war United States see Mayhew (1991).
3tionship of our paper to the literature. In Section 3 we present the model. In Section 4 we
describe the data and in Section 5 the econometric speciﬁcation. Sections 6 contains the
results of the empirical analysis. The results of the counterfactual experiments are described
in Section 7 and concluding remarks are in Section 8.
2 Related Literature
Contrary to our approach, the existing literature has addressed the phenomena of turnout
(and selective abstention) and split-ticket voting separately. We therefore discuss each liter-
ature in turn.
There is a vast theoretical literature on turnout.6 The starting point of this literature is
represented by the calculus of voting model of Downs (1957), Tullock (1967) and Riker and
Ordershook (1968). The common premise of these theories is that voting is costly, and hence
a rational citizen will vote only if the beneﬁt of voting exceeds its cost; that is, if pB+D>C ,
where p is the probability the citizen’s vote decides the election, B is the beneﬁt associated
with inducing the desired electoral outcome, D is the beneﬁtf r o mf u l ﬁlling the citizen’s civic
duty of voting and C is the cost of voting. Diﬀerent theories, however, focus on diﬀerent
aspects of this basic framework. For example, while pivotal voter models (e.g., Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999), Ledyard (1984), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985)), focus on
endogenizing the probability a citizen’s vote is decisive (or pivotal), rule-utilitarian models
(e.g., Coate and Conlin (2004), Feddersen and Sandroni (2002), Harsany (1980) and Morton
(1991)), endogenize the notion of civic duty.7 Another approach, adopted by Ferejohn and
Fiorina (1974), is based on minmax regret theory. In particular, their theory of turnout is
based on the idea that citizens may vote in order to avoid the regret they would experience
if they were to abstain in a situation where their vote would have been decisive.8
6See, e.g., Aldrich (1993) for a survey. Note that several theories of turnout also admit the possibility of
selective abstention.
7For a thorough review of rule-utilitarian models of turnout, see Coate and Conlin (2004). For another
interesting model where civic duty is endogenous and can be inﬂuenced by party leaders, see Shachar and
Nalebuﬀ (1999).
8Another interesting approach to the study of turnout postulates that citizens are averse to ambiguity
(Ghirardato and Katz (2002)). Hence, citizens may abstain in an election if the policy positions of both
4In our analysis, we consider a model with a continuum of citizens where no vote is pivotal,
a n dw em o d e lt h ed i r e c tb e n e ﬁts (including civic duty) and costs of voting. Also, our model
relies on the premise that citizens minimize their expected regret, and the possibility of regret
arises solely from citizens’ uncertainty about candidates’ positions.
The empirical literature on turnout in U.S. national elections is also vast.9 A large part of
this literature tries to identify factors that are systematically related to voters’ participation
in individual elections, by estimating reduced form speciﬁcations where turnout is regressed
on voters’ characteristics and elections’ attributes (e.g., Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980)).
Another signiﬁcant part focuses instead on either testing some of the predictions of the
theories described above (e.g., Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), Riker and Ordershook (1968) and
Matsusaka and Palda (1993)), or estimating structural models derived from these theories
(e.g., Coate and Conlin (2004), Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1987), Shachar and Nalebuﬀ
(1999)).10 Palfrey and Poole (1987) estimate a joint model of participation and voting in a
presidential election, and analyze the eﬀects of citizens’ ideologya n di n f o r m a t i o no nt h e i r
electoral choices.11
Turning our attention to the literature on split-ticket voting, theoretical models have
focused mainly on the policy implications of divided government, and fall broadly within
two categories. A ﬁrst group of theories (see, e.g., Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1997) and
Jacobson (1990)), postulate that there are diﬀerent issues surrounding the presidential and
the congressional elections, thus providing diﬀerent (election speciﬁc) incentives for citizens
and candidates. In an environment where citizens perceive Republican candidates to be
relatively better at dealing with national policy issues and Democratic candidates to be
relatively better at catering to their districts’ needs, citizens will be relatively more likely to
candidates are ambiguous and “ambiguity complements” (that is, one candidate looks better than the other
under some scenario, while the opposite is true under another scenario).
9See, e.g., Matsusaka and Palda (1999) for a survey.
10By and large, empirical evidence based on individual-level data shows that the probability of being
pivotal does not aﬀect turnout. Other factors related to the direct beneﬁts and costs of voting are however
important.
11See also Bartels (1996).
5vote for the Republican candidate in the presidential election and the Democratic candidate
in the congressional election.12 In a second group of theories (see, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, 1996) and Fiorina (1992)), split-ticket voting may emerge as the optimal choice of
moderate voters seeking to induce governments to implement moderate policies. Since the
policy-making process entails some compromise between the executive and the legislature,
citizens with relatively moderate positions will vote for candidates of diﬀerent parties for
President and Congress in an attempt to moderate the ﬁnal policy outcome.13
These theoretical models oﬀer useful insights about the relationship between split-ticket
voting and divided government, and generate interesting predictions that are by and large
consistent with aggregate stylized facts.14 Since a fundamental premise of these models is
that split-ticket voting is inherently an equilibrium phenomenon, we believe it is important
to ask whether equilibrium considerations (either within and/or across elections) are really
needed to explain individual-level data, or whether observed split-ticket voting may be the
outcome of sincere citizens’ optimal behavior. The results of our empirical analysis clearly
indicate that this is not the case, thus providing indirect support for alternative explanations
of split-ticket voting.
The empirical literature on split-ticket voting in U.S. national elections focuses primarily
on testing various predictions of the theories described above. The results of these studies,
that rely almost entirely on reduced form empirical models, are for the most part mixed.15
12While in Jacobson (1990) citizens treat the presidential and congressional elections as separate, and
divided government is simply a by-product of the fact that diﬀerent issues are relevant in the two elections,
in Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997) split-ticket voting and divided government are equilibrium results of
the strategic interaction among voters from diﬀerent districts.
13In Fiorina (1992), voters internalize the institutional setting in which policies are decided, and vote (sin-
cerely) over the four possible policy outcomes of divided and united governments. In Alesina and Rosenthal
(1996), on the other hand, split-ticket voting is an equilibrium outcome induced by the strategic behavior of
voters.
14Note, however, that the model by Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997) cannot explain situations of divided
government with a Democratic President and a Republican Congress (e.g., Clinton’s second term).
15For example, Alvarez and Schousen (1993) test the implications of both Fiorina’s and Jacobson’s models
and ﬁnd a relatively greater support for the latter in the data. Born (1994) also ﬁnds evidence against some
of the implications of Fiorina’s model. Mattei and Howes (2000) ﬁnd that only a few sophisticated voters
6Mebane (2000) estimates two equilibrium structural models based on Alesina and Rosen-
thal (1996) and Fiorina (1992), respectively, and shows that the Alesina-Rosenthal model
outperforms the one by Fiorina in its ability to ﬁt the data.
3 The Model
We model citizens’ participation and voting decisions in a presidential election year:t h a t
is, a situation where presidential and congressional elections occur simultaneously. While
the presidential election is nation-wide (that is, all citizens face the same set of candidates
regardless of where they reside), congressional elections are held at the district level (that is,
citizens residing in diﬀerent congressional districts face diﬀerent sets of candidates).16
We let h ∈ {1,...,m} denote an electoral district, P the presidential election, H the con-
gressional election in district h,a n de ∈ {P,{H}m
h=1} a generic election.17 In each election,
there are two candidates running for oﬃce: a Republican candidate, Re,a n daD e m o c r a t i c
candidate, De,a n dw el e tc ∈ {RP,D P,{RH,D H}m
h=1} denote a generic candidate.18 Each
candidate c is characterized by a (given) position yc ∈ Y =[ −1,1],w h e r eY denotes the
(unidimensional) liberal-conservative ideological space, and is either an incumbent or a chal-
lenger. We let Ic be an indicator that takes the value one if candidate c is an incumbent and
zero otherwise. We refer to an election where neither candidate is an incumbent as an open
election.
T h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fex-ante heterogeneous citizens (with mass one) and we let j
denote a generic citizen. Citizens diﬀer along several dimensions. Each citizen j resides in
split their tickets with the intent of “balancing” the government, while most of split-ticket voting is related
to incumbency and citizens’ perceptions about incumbents and, more generally, candidates’ attributes (see
also Burden and Kimball (1998)).
16Consistent with the existing literature on split-ticket voting, we restrict attention to House elections,
which are held every election year for every district. Hence, each citizen faces both a presidential election
as well as a House election. Senate elections, on the other hand, are staggered and only about a third of all
states have a Senate election in any given election year.
17The total number of U.S. congressional districts is m = 435.
18We ignore the fact that in some elections independent candidates may also be running and we exclude
from our analysis elections where only one candidate runs unopposed.
7district hj and has demographic characteristics xj, which include the citizen’s age, race, gen-
der, education, and income. Citizens also diﬀer with respect to their general attitude toward
political parties and may either feel an attachment to a speciﬁc party or no attachment at all.
Following the literature, we refer to feelings of partisan attachment as party identiﬁcation
and let kj = d,r,i denote citizen j’s party identiﬁcation, where d, r and i indicate citizens
that identify themselves as democrats, republicans and independents, respectively.
Citizens can either be informed about electoral candidates or uninformed. The infor-
mation potentially available to citizens depends on the election. Incumbents who run for
reelection to a seat in Congress as well as presidential candidates (regardless of their incum-
bency status) have public records of their activities while in oﬃce.19 Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that their positions can in principle be known before an election.
Challengers who run for a congressional seat, on the other hand, typically do not have com-
parable records.20 To capture this asymmetry, we assume that challengers are drawn from




ﬁned over Y , where, for each election H, yDH <y RH. Hence, before the elections, the only
information potentially available on challengers who run for Congress are the distributions
of their positions, which we allow to diﬀer by party and electoral district.
Based on these considerations, we assume that if a citizen residing in district h is in-
formed,s h ek n o w syRP, yDP, IRHyRH, IDHyDH, (1 − IRH)FR
h (yRH), (1 − IDH)FD
h (yDH).21 If,
on the other hand, the citizen is uninformed, we assume she has uniform priors over the pos-





h (yDH) denote the (uniform) distributions of the citizen’s priors over the position
of the Republican and the Democratic candidate in the presidential and the congressional
19For example, the history of roll call voting by each member of Congress is readily available.
20Although many individuals who run for Congress have prior experience in public oﬃces at the local or
state level (see, e.g., Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), public records of their activities either do not exist
or are not easily accessible.
21Note that for each election H, either there is an incumbent Republican running against a Democratic
challenger (i.e., IRH =1and IDH =0 ), or there is a Democratic incumbent running against a Republican
challenger (i.e., IRH =0and IDH =1 ), or the election is open (i.e., IRH =0and IDH =0 ).
8election (in her district), respectively. Consistent with basic stylized facts about American
politics (which we assume to be known even by uninformed voters), we impose the following
restrictions on these distributions:22 (i) the support of GD
P(yDP) is [−1,0] and the support of
GR
P(yRP) is [0,1]; and (ii) the support of both GR
h(yRH) and GD
h (yDH) is the entire ideological
space Y =[ −1,1],b u tyDH <y RH for each congressional election H.
By letting ∆j denote the information set of a citizen j residing in district h,a n dλj be






(yRP,y DP,I RHyRH,I DHyDH,(1 − IRH)FR
h (yRH),(1 − IDH)FD





h (yRH)) if λj =0
(1)
Citizens are heterogeneous with respect to their ideological positions which determine
their (induced) preferences over candidates. Consistent with a long tradition in political
economy, we assume citizens’ preferences over the liberal-conservative ideological space are
single-peaked and their utility from voting for a candidate decreases with the distance be-
tween the candidate’s position and their own. We specify the ex-post payoﬀ a citizen j
obtains from voting for a generic candidate c as
u
j
c = u(yj(xj,k j),y c) (2)
where u(·) is single-peaked at yj(·) and is a decreasing function of the distance between yj(·)
and yc,a n dyj(xj,k j) ∈ Y denotes citizen j’s position in the liberal-conservative ideological
space, which we allow to depend on j’s demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation.23
We let Fy(y | x,k) denote the distribution of citizens’ positions. We also specify citizen j’s








22These restrictions guarantee that in any election the Republican candidate is relatively more conservative
than the Democratic candidate, and the whithin party variation of the positions of presidential candidates
is smaller than that of congressional candidates for both parties. See, for example, Poole and Rosenthal
(1997).
23Note that uj
c is an indirect utility function.





Since the positions of candidates in an election may be uncertain and citizens diﬀer with
respect to their information, we also specify citizen j’s von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-ante





a | ∆j]. (4)




Ad i r e c ti m p l i c a t i o no ft h ep r e s e n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t ya b o u tc a n d i d a t e s ’p o s i t i o n si st h e
possibility of ex-post regret generated by voting for the “wrong” candidate. By letting
vj
e ∈ {a,b} denote citizen j’s voting decision in election e, 1{·} be an indicator function
that takes the value one if the expression within braces is true and zero otherwise, and Mj
c
≥ 0 denote citizen j’s expected regret (or mistake) from voting for candidate c ∈ {a,b} in









c) | ∆j]. (5)
Clearly, if a citizen does not vote the expected regret from voting is zero.25 Citizens may,
however, feel an obligation to vote and we let θ
j
e ≥ 0 denote citizen j’s cost (or regret) from
abstaining in election e, which we allow to diﬀer across citizens and elections.26 We let Qe
θ(θ)
denote the distribution of θ
j
e in the citizenry.
The last dimension of citizens’ heterogeneity we consider is their type, where citizens are
either “sincere” or “contrarian”. We model the electoral participation and voting decisions
of a sincere citizen as the solution to a two-stage optimization problem, where in each
election, the citizen ﬁrst chooses whether to participate or to abstain, and then conditional










b are speciﬁc to election e. Hence, we suppress
the index e to simplify notation.
25As pointed out in Section 2, voting models typically specify a direct cost of voting. In our model, this
cost is given by the expected regret from voting.
26In the literature, the utility loss from not participating in an election is typically related to a citizen’s
sense of civic duty (see our discussion in Section 2).
10on participating decides who to vote for. Our theory of participation and voting is based on
the premise that sincere citizens minimize their expected regret.
Consider a generic election e ∈ {P,H} with candidates a and b running, a,b ∈ {Re,D e},
and a generic sincere citizen j residing in district h.L e tpj
e ∈ {0,1} denote citizen j’s par-
ticipation decision in election e,w h e r epj
e =0indicates abstention and pj
e =1participation.
Suppose citizen j participates in election e.T h e ns h ec h o o s e st ov o t ef o rt h ec a n d i d a t et h a t
minimizes her expected regret from voting. If we let vj∗
e ∈ {a,b} denote citizen j’s optimal
















a n di nt h ee v e n tt h a tMj
a = M
j
b the citizen randomizes between the two candidates with
equal probability.
This leads to our ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 If a sincere citizen j residing in district h participates in election e ∈ {P,H}













a =0 , citizen j randomizes between the two candidates with equal probability.
Proof. To prove the result we have to show that for any citizen j and any election e,
voting for a candidate c associated with the smallest expected regret is equivalent to voting
for the candidate associated with the largest relative expected payoﬀ.




b if and only if Wj
a > 0.N o t e t h a t s i n c e U
j
b = −Uj























a | ∆j] > 0
11which is equivalent to Wj














Proposition 1 states that if a sincere citizen participates in an election, she votes for the
candidate associated with the highest expected payoﬀ. Hence, expected regret minimization
and expected utility maximization are equivalent, in the sense that they induce the same
voting behavior.
Without loss of generality, suppose vj∗
e = c ∈ {a,b}, and denote the expected regret







c) | ∆j]. (7)
If we let pj∗
e ∈ {0,1} denote citizen j’s optimal participation decision in election e,w ec a n
now state our second proposition:
Proposition 2 The optimal participation decision in election e ∈ {P,H} of a sincere citizen


















e, citizen j randomizes between abstaining and participating in election e with
equal probability.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows trivially from backwards induction and Proposition 1.27
In our analysis, we also allow for the possibility that some citizens make voting decisions
that are inconsistent with the optimization problem we just described and we refer to these
citizens as contrarian voters. In particular, we deﬁne a citizen to be contrarian in an election
if she votes against her immediate preferences; that is, she votes for the candidate opposite
27Note that Mj∗
c is speciﬁc to election e.
12to the one that would maximize her expected payoﬀ from voting sincerely.28 Consistent with
our notation, we say that citizen j residing in district h is a contrarian voter in election
e ∈ {P,H} where candidates a and b are running, a,b ∈ {Re,D e},i fe i t h e rs h ev o t e sf o r
candidate a when Wj
a < 0 or votes for candidate b when Wj
a > 0.N o t e t h a tb y d e ﬁnition
contrarian voters never abstain.
As pointed out in the introduction, the main goal of the paper is to quantify the extent
to which sincere voting can explain observed participation and voting decisions in national
(presidential and congressional) elections. To achieve this goal, we simply deﬁne contrarian
voting as all instances of “deviations” from what sincere citizens would do in an election. In
other words, we model contrarian voting as a residual category of behavior without attempt-
ing in any way to explain why such deviations could come about, or what are the underlying
primitives that would rationalize such behavior.
Note that our model of the participation and voting decisions of sincere citizens can
clearly account for citizens abstaining in either one or both elections. This is the case since
candidates’ positions as well as citizens’ information and (possibly) their attitude toward
abstention are diﬀerent in presidential and congressional elections.
Moreover, the model can in principle generate split-ticket voting as the optimal choice
of sincere citizens. To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Suppose for
simplicity that all citizens in a given district h know the positions of the two candidates
running in the presidential election P as well as the positions of the two candidates running
in the congressional election H, and these positions are as follows: yDH <y DP <y RH <y RP.




H = θ > 0 for all citizens. Then, all sincere citizens with positions
in the interval ((yDH + yRH)/2, (yDP + yRP)/2) will choose to participate in both elections
and vote for the Democratic presidential candidate and for the Republican congressional
candidate.
28As discussed in Section 2, the literature typically refers to strategic voting as an individual’s optimal
response to other citizens’ voting choices when the individual takes into consideration the probability of
being pivotal. Our analysis abstracts from such (game-theoretic) considerations. However, our deﬁnition of
contrarian voting is somewhat related to Riker’s (1986) deﬁnition of strategic voting as “voting contrary to
one’s immediate tastes in order to obtain an advantage in the long run.”
13Clearly, the extent to which split-ticket voting (and all other voting patterns that are
observed in the data) can be explained by sincere voting depends on the distribution of the
actual conﬁgurations of the relative positions of candidates competing in presidential and
congressional elections, as well as the distribution of citizens’ positions, and is therefore an
empirical question.
4D a t a
We consider all presidential election years after 1970 and let t ∈ {1972, 1976, 1980, 1984,
1988,1992, 1996, 2000} denote a generic year. For each presidential election, Table 1 lists the
names of the Democratic and Republican candidates. Entries in bold denote the winner of
each presidential election (column 2) and the party who obtained the majority of the House
of representatives in each year (column 3). For each of the eight presidential election years
we consider, our empirical analysis relies on two sources of data: the American National
Election Studies (NES) and the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space Scores.29
For each relevant year, the NES contains detailed, individual-level information on the
participation and voting decisions in presidential and congressional elections of a representa-
tive (cross-section) sample of the American voting-age population.30 We let Nt = {1,...,nt}
denote the sample of citizens in presidential election year t,w h e r ent i st h es a m p l es i z e . 31
For each individual in the sample, j ∈ Nt, we observe the congressional district where he or
she resides, hj, the identity of the Democratic and the Republican candidate competing for
29Both data sets are available online at http://www.umich.edu/~nes and http://voteview.uh.edu/basic
.htm, respectively.
30For thorough discussions of potential limitations of the survey data on participation and voting in the
NES see, e.g., Anderson and Silver (1986), Palfrey and Poole (1985), Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) and
Wright (1993). Note, however, that the NES represent the best and most widely used source of individual-
level data on electoral participation and voting.
31Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we drop from our sample individuals who reside in Washington
D.C. (since they do not face congressional elections) and those who face uncontested congressional elections
(since they do not have the option of voting either for the Republican or the Democratic candidate). After
eliminating observations with missing variables, the sample sizes in each presidential election year are equal
to 1634 in 1972, 1368 in 1976, 888 in 1980, 1407 in 1984, 1112 in 1988, 1531 in 1992, 1170 in 1996 and 1016
in 2000.
14election in his or her congressional district, (DHj,R Hj)t, and whether any of the candidates
is an incumbent in that district, (IDHj,I RHj)t. For each of the two elections (presidential and
congressional) faced by each individual, the NES also contains (self-reported) information
on whether the individual abstains in the election, votes for the Democratic candidate or
votes for the Republican candidate. We let V
j
P ∈ {A,R,D} and V
j
Hj ∈ {A,R,D} denote cit-
izen j’s choices in the presidential and congressional election, respectively, where A denotes
abstention and D or R indicate that the citizen voted for the Democratic or the Republi-




Hj) ∈ Ω = {AA, AD, AR, DA, RA,
DD, DR, RD, RR} as citizen j’s observed voting proﬁle. The sample distribution of voting
proﬁles for each of the years we consider is reported in Table 2.
For each sample Nt, the NES also contains detailed information on individual demo-
graphic characteristics and (self-reported) party identiﬁcation. In our analysis, we consider
the following variables: the variable Age denotes an individual’s age; Black is a race indica-
t o rv a r i a b l et h a te q u a l so n eif an individual is black; Lowedu is a dummy variable denoting
whether an individual does not have a high school degree; Highedu is a dummy variable de-
noting whether an individual has a college degree; Femaleis a gender indicator variable that
is equal to one if an individual is a woman; Lowinc is a dummy variable denoting whether
an individual’s family income is lower than median family income; and Dem, Rep and Ind
are three (mutually exclusive) dummy variables denoting whether an individual considers
him or herself to be a democrat, a republican or an independent, respectively.32 Using the
notation we introduced to describe our model, we have that xt
j =( Agej,B l a c k j,L o w e d u j,
Higheduj,F e m a l e j,L o w i n c j)t and kt
j =( Demj,R e p j,I n d j)t. The sample averages of all
the variables for each of the years we consider are reported in Table 3.
To estimate our model we also need to construct measures of the citizens’ information
sets in any presidential election year t. In other words, we have to describe the information
32Consistent with most of the empirical literature on voting (see, e.g., McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
(1997) and Petrochik (1989)), we classify individuals who state self to be independent leaning democrats as
democrats and independent leaning republicans as republicans. However, we also estimated our model after
changing this classiﬁcation and treating such individuals as independents. This change has little eﬀect on
our main empirical results.
15potentially available to citizens concerning the candidates competing in any election that
is relevant for them (i.e., the presidential election and the congressional election in their
district) in any given t. Consider a generic district h with congressional election H.P a r to f
the information is whether an incumbent is running in the congressional election, which is
captured by the variables (IDH,I RH)t described above. The remaining information concerns
the positions of the candidates running in the presidential election, (yRP,y DP)t,t h ep o s i t i o n
of the incumbent (if any) running in the congressional election, (IRHyRH,I DHyDH)t,a n dt h e
distributions of the populations of potential congressional candidates from which challengers
are drawn ((1 − IRH)FR
h (yRH), (1 − IDH)FD
h (yDH))t. To obtain measures of the positions
of candidates competing in presidential and congressional elections, we use the Poole and
Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space Scores.
Using data on roll call voting by each member of Congress and support to roll call votes
by each President, Poole and Rosenthal developed a methodology to estimate the positions
of all politicians who ever served either as Presidents or members of Congress, on the liberal-
conservative ideological (common) space [−1,1].33 These estimates, which are comparable
across politicians and across time, are conta i n e di nt h e i rN O M I N A T EC o m m o nS p a c eS c o r e s
data set.34 These estimates provide the measures of (yRP,y DP) and (IRHyRH,I DHyDH)m
h=1
we use in our empirical analysis for each relevant year.35 In addition, for each presiden-
33For a discussion of potential limitations of the methodology proposed by Poole and Rosenthal see, e.g.,
Heckman and Snyder (1997). For a comparison of alternative estimation procedures see Clinton et al. (2001).
Note, however, that none of the other procedures has been used to generate a comprehensive data set similar
t ot h eo n eb yP o o l ea n dR o s e n t h a l .
34Details about the methodology and the data are available on-line at http://voteview.uh.edu/basic.htm.
See also Poole and Rosenthal (1999) at http://voteview.uh.edu/prapsd99.pdf. Note that the Poole and
Rosenthal NOMINATE data set also contains estimates of the positions of politicians on a second dimension,
which we do not use in our analysis. In fact, according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997), after 1970 the second
dimension has become irrelevant and “roll call voting again became largey a matter of positioning on a single,
liberal-conservative dimension” (p. 5).
35Note that Michael Dukakis, the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988, who at the time was the
governor of Massachussets, is the only relevant politician in our analysis for whom there is no estimate in
the Poole and Rosenthal data set. Following Gaines and Segal (1988), we approximate Dukakis’ position on
the liberal-conservative ideological space with that of the Democratic Massachussets senator in 1988 (Ted
16tial election year, we use the empirical distributions of these estimates for Democratic and





spectively. In particular, we assume that FD
h (·)=FD
L (·) and FR
h (·)=FR
L (·) for all h ∈ L,
where L ∈ {Northeast, Midwest, West, South} denotes a region of the United States. This
speciﬁcation allows us to capture important geographic diﬀerences among congressional can-
didates for each party, while at the same time allowing us to accurately characterize each
empirical distribution function.36 Table 4 contains the positions of all presidential candidates
and the average positions of Democratic and Republican representatives by region for each
of the years we consider.37
5 Econometric Speciﬁcation
In this section, we describe the general speciﬁcation of the econometric model, the parameters
that need to be estimated and the estimation procedure. Since for each of the eight presi-
dential election years we consider (1972-2000) the procedure we use to estimate our model
and the model speciﬁcation are the same, in what follows we suppress all time subscripts
that refer to a particular year.
In the model described in Section 3, citizens’ participation and voting decisions in pres-
idential and congressional elections are deterministic. Given the vector of individual at-




Hj) Propositions 1 and 2 fully characterize the optimal
behavior of any sincere citizen j. Analogously, the behavior of contrarian voters is also
characterized by a deterministic relation. As described in Section 4, our data contains in-
formation on district of residence, demographic characteristics, party identiﬁcation and the
Kennedy).
36Note that it would be unfeasible to characterize non-parametrically a separate distribution function for
each party in each state (let alone each district), since the number of representatives of either party in each
state in any given year is small.
37Recall that if citizens are uninformed, their priors over the possible positions of candidates in the presi-




H that we described
in Section 3. Note that the mean priors are equal to −0.5 and 0.5 for the Democratic and the Republican pres-
idential candidates, respectively, and −0.33 and 0.33 for the Democratic and the Republican congressional
candidates, respectively.
17information potentially available on presidential and congressional candidates for a represen-
tative sample N of citizens (that is, we observe (hj,x j,k j,∆j)j∈N). However, for any citizen
j ∈ N we do not observe the citizen’s position, yj, whether the citizen is informed or unin-




Hj, and the citizen’s type (i.e., whether
the citizen is sincere or contrarian). Hence, from the point of view of the econometrician,
the observed behavior of each citizen is probabilistic, and to estimate our model we need to
specify the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the population.
We assume that the distribution of citizens’ positions Fy(y | x,k) is a Beta distribution
over the support Y =[ −1,1].38 A Beta distribution is fully characterized by two parameters,
α,β > 0, and to capture the (possible) dependence of the distribution of citizens’ positions on
their demographic characteristics, x =( Age, Black, Lowedu, Highedu, Female, Lowinc),
and party identiﬁcation, k =( Dem, Rep, Ind),w ea d o p tt h ef o l l o w i n gs p e c i ﬁcation:39
α =e x p ( α1Dem+ α2Rep + α3Ind+ α4Age + α5Black
+α6Lowedu + α7Highedu+ α8Female+ α9Lowinc)
and
β =e x p ( β1Dem+ β2Rep + β3Ind).
We also allow the probability a citizen is informed, πλ =P r ( λ =1 ) , to depend on the
citizen’s demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation and we specify this probability
to have the following logistic form:
πλ =
exp(γ)
1+e x p ( γ)
where
γ = γ1Dem+ γ2Rep + γ3Ind+ γ4Age + γ5Black
+γ6Lowedu + γ7Highedu+ γ8Female+ γ9Lowinc
38The family of Beta distributions is the most ﬂexible family of parametric distributions for continuous
random variables with a ﬁnite support (see, e.g., Johnson and Kotz 1970; vol. 1, pp. 37-56).
39Note that, to simplify notation, we suppress the subscript j from all variables.
18Turning our attention to citizens’ attitudes toward abstention, we specify the distribu-
tion of citizens’ costs of abstaining in the presidential elections QP
θ (θ) to be a log-normal
distribution with parameters (µ1,σ). Similarly, we specify the distribution of citizens’ costs
of abstaining in a congressional election QH
θ (θ) to be log-normal with parameters (µ2,σ) for
all H.40
Recall that the primary goal of our analysis is to quantify the extent to which sincere
voting can explain observed voting proﬁles. To this end we introduce contrarian voting only
as a device to account for deviations from the way sincere citizens would vote in two (presi-
dential and congressional) simultaneous elections. Since we do not observe citizens’ positions
in the ideological space, it turns out that in order to identify what is the smallest fraction of
contrarian voters that is needed to explain the data, we only need to consider individual de-
viations in at most one election. We therefore assume that each citizen is either sincere (with
probability 1 − πs), contrarian in the presidential election (with probability πs(1 − πH)), or
contrarian in the congressional election (with probability πsπH). We allow these probabilities
to depend on citizens’ positions and to diﬀer by citizens’ party identiﬁcation. In particular,
we specify πs and πH to have the following logistic forms:
πs =
exp((δ1 + δ2y)Dem+( δ3 + δ4y)Rep +( δ5 + δ6y)Ind)
1+e x p ( ( δ1 + δ2y)Dem+( δ3 + δ4y)Rep +( δ5 + δ6y)Ind)
and
πH =
exp(δ7Dem+ δ8Rep + δ9Ind)
1+e x p ( δ7Dem+ δ8Rep + δ9Ind)
Finally, we specify the utility function u(·) to have a quadratic form:
u(y,yc)=−(y − yc)
2
We estimate our model by maximum likelihood. The contribution to the likelihood of each
observation in the sample is equal to the probability of observing the (endogenous) voting
40Allowing the variance parameters in the two distributions to diﬀer does not change any of the estimates
of the other parameters while decreasing the precision of the estimates of the variance parameters. Hence,
we restrict σ to be the same in both distributions (a restriction that cannot be rejected at conventional
statistical levels for any of the years we consider).
19proﬁle V ∈ Ω = {AA, AD, AR, DA, RA, DD, DR, RD, RR}, conditional on the vector
of (exogenous) characteristics Z =( h,x,k,∆), given the vector of the model’s parameters
φ =( α1,...,α9, β1,...,β3, γ1,...,γ9, δ1,...,δ9,µ 1,µ 2,σ). Using the characterizations in Section
3 and the speciﬁcation of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity described above,
the likelihood function can easily be derived (and is therefore omitted).
6R e s u l t s
In this section, we summarize our estimates and our main empirical ﬁndings, discussing
each component of our analysis in turn. The maximum likelihood estimates (and standard
errors) of the model parameters for each of the eight presidential election years we consider
(1972-2000) are reported in Table 5.
6.1 Goodness-of-Fit
Before presenting the main results of our empirical analysis, we assess the ﬁt of our estimated
model. For each presidential election year t ∈ {1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,1992, 1996,
2000}, in Table 6 we compare the distribution of the voting proﬁles predicted by the model
to the empirical distribution, both for the overall sample and for each group of citizens with
diﬀerent party identiﬁcation (i.e., democrats, republicans and independents). To assess how









where ft(V ) denotes the empirical frequency of the voting proﬁle V ∈ Ω = {AA, AD, AR,
DA, RA, DD, DR, RD, RR} in year t, b ft(V ) denotes the frequency of that voting proﬁle
predicted by the estimated model, and nt is the number of observations in year t.41 As we can
see from Table 6, the model tracks observed citizens’ participation and voting decisions in
every presidential election year remarkably well, and each goodness-of-ﬁt test cannot reject
the model at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
41Note that the goodness-of-ﬁt test has eight degrees of freedom. This is, however, an upper bound because
it does not take into account that the parameters in the model are estimated.
206.2 Citizens’ Preferences, Information and Types
Our empirical analysis allows us to obtain estimates of the distributions of (unobserved)
citizens’ positions on the liberal-conservative ideological space [−1,1]. Note that the esti-
mation of these distributions, which are deﬁned over the same space as the distributions
of candidates’ positions, relies only on citizens’ observed participation and voting decisions,
conditional on citizens’ characteristics and the identity of the candidates running in the
elections they face.42
Several interesting results emerge from the estimated distributions of citizen’s positions
Ft
y(y | xt,kt) where t =1 9 7 2 , 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,1992, 1996, 2000.43 Citizens’ de-
mographic characteristics are systematically related to their ideological positions. Ceteris
paribus, citizens become more conservative as they grow older; blacks tend to be more liberal
than non-blacks; individuals with relatively low levels of education (i.e., without a high school
degree) and individuals with relatively high levels of education (i.e., with at least a college
degree) are more liberal than individuals with intermediate levels of education; women tend
to be more liberal than men; and individuals whose income is below the median tend to be
more liberal than those with higher levels of income. By and large, these ﬁndings hold for
each of the years we consider.44
For each presidential election year, in Figure 1 we plot the estimated aggregate distribu-
42Note that the NES contains a variable that measures citizens’ self-reported placements on a liberal-
conservative 7-point scale, which is widely used in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Mebane (2000) and
Poole and Rosenthal (1984)). There are several problems with using this variable as a measure of citizens’
positions. For instance, interpersonal comparisons are problematic, since diﬀerent people may interpret the
scale diﬀerently. Moreover, estimates of the distribution of citizens’ positions based on this variable are not
comparable with the distribution of congressional candidates’ positions and across time.
43Recall that the distribution of citizens’ position in any given year t is characterized by the parameters
(α1,...,α9)t and (β1,...,β3)t. To interpret the estimates of the parameters associated with citizens’ demo-
graphic characteristics, note that, ceteris paribus,ap o s i t i v eα coeﬃcient shifts the distribution of citizens’
positions to the right (i.e., toward more conservative positions), while a negative coeﬃcient shifts it to the
left (i.e., toward more liberal positions).
44These ﬁndings are similar to the results of Degan (2003) who estimates a dynamic model of voting in
two consecutive presidential elections.
21tions of citizens’ positions, and in Figure 2 we plot these distributions by party identiﬁcation.
As we can see from these ﬁgures, the 1970s seem to be characterized by a process of relative
convergence in citizens’ ideological positions. This tendency, however, is reversed in the two
decades that follow, leading to a polarization of the American electorate. Interestingly, while
the estimated distributions of the ideological positions of citizens who deﬁne themselves as
democrats, independent or republicans are always ordered in the expected way on the liberal-
conservative space, the overlap of the supports of these distributions is substantial, and the
relative positions of the independents and the “partisans” (i.e., democrats and republicans)
change over time.
Our ﬁndings about the evolution of the distribution of citizens’ positions over time parallel
the results of McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) about
the changes in the distribution of representatives’ positions in the post-war period. They
ﬁnd that starting in the mid 1970s, this distribution has become increasingly bimodal.
Turning our attention to the probability citizens’ are informed about electoral candidates,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant relationships between an individual’s demographic characteristics and his
or her probability of being informed.45 In particular, for each of the years we consider, our
estimates imply that older and more educated individuals tend to be more informed than
their younger and less educated counterparts, respectively; blacks are less informed than
non-blacks; and individuals whose income is below the median tend to be less informed than
those with higher levels of income. Interestingly, while in the 1970s women are less informed
than men, in the 1980s and 1990s they become more informed than men (although gender
diﬀerences in information are not always statistically signiﬁcant).
In Table 7, we report our estimates of the proportion of informed citizens both at the
aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation from 1972 to 2000. While we ﬁnd no evidence of
a trend in information over time (either decreasing or increasing), our ﬁndings indicate that
republicans are systematically more informed than democrats (except in the 2000 election).
Furthermore, partisans are always more informed than independents.
For each presidential election year, our empirical analysis also allows us to quantify the
45Recall that in any given year t, the probability a citizen is informed is characterized by the parameters
(γ1,...,γ9)t.
22distribution of (unobserved) citizens’ types, by estimating the probability that each individ-
ual is either sincere, contrarian in the presidential election, or contrarian in the congressional
election in his or her district.46 Table 8 contains the estimated proportions of sincere indi-
viduals in the citizenry both at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation for each of the
years we consider. Several interesting observations emerge from this table. The aggregate
proportion of sincere citizens ranges from 82% to 93%. This implies that in every election
year a non-negligible fraction of the American electorate does not behave sincerely. The
aggregate proportion of sincere citizens, however, steadily increases over time, although no
similar trend can be detected within groups of citizens that diﬀer by their party identiﬁcation.
In Table 9, we report our estimates of the proportions of contrarian voters in presidential
and congressional elections both at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation for each
presidential election year. For any given election, the proportion of contrarian voters is
relative to the population of citizens who vote in the election (that is, citizens who abstain
a r ee x c l u d e df r o mt h ec a l c u l a t i o n ) . A sw ec a ns e ef r o mt h i st a b l e ,i ti sg e n e r a l l yt h ec a s e
that the proportion of contrarian voters is higher in congressional elections than in the
presidential election. Also, by and large, contrarian voters are relatively more prevalent
among independents than either among democrats or republicans. Overall, a signiﬁcant
fraction of the population of voters in each presidential election year does not vote sincerely.
6.3 Turnout and Selective Abstention
Our model implies a positive relationship between information and turnout. Since unin-
formed citizens are more likely to make “voting mistakes” and hence have larger expected
regret from voting, they abstain more than informed citizens. To illustrate this relationship,
we present Table 10, where we report the proportions of informed and uninformed citizens
who abstain in the presidential election, abstain in the congressional election, and abstain
in both elections, implied by our model.
The diﬀerence in the participation behavior of informed and uninformed citizens is most
noticeable in presidential elections, where informed citizens (who know the positions of the
presidential candidates and hence have no expected regret from voting) never abstain. Un-
46For any given t, these probabilities are characterized by the parameters (δ1,...,δ9)t.
23informed citizens, on the other hand, are uncertain about the positions of the presidential
candidates, and may therefore optimally choose to abstain if their expected regret from
voting is larger than their regret from abstaining.47 According to our estimates, the pro-
portion of uninformed citizens who abstain in a presidential election varies between 42%
and 65%, depending on the year. Uninformed citizens abstain more than informed ones
also in congressional elections, but since even informed citizens face some uncertainty about
the positions of congressional challengers, abstention rates are positive also among informed
citizens. Consistent with what we observe in the data, our estimated model predicts that
in each presidential election year abstention is higher in congressional elections than in the
presidential election, and some individuals selectively abstain in one election but vote in the
other.
To understand these ﬁndings, note that our estimates imply that the average regret from
abstaining in the presidential election is always smaller than in a congressional election (or, in
other words, citizens ﬁnd it relatively more costly to make voting mistakes in the presidential
election than in a congressional election). This result alone would lead to relatively more
abstention in the presidential election. At the same time, however, our estimates also imply
that the average expected regret from voting in the presidential election is always smaller
than in a congressional election, and the second eﬀect (which is due to the fact that, in
general, there is more information, and hence less uncertainty, about presidential candidates
than congressional candidates), always dominates.
When combined with our previous ﬁndings that independents are systematically less
informed than democrats, who are in turn less informed than republicans (see Table 7),
these results also explain the fact that, in every presidential election year, independents are
relatively more likely to abstain than partisan citizens (see Table 6), and democrats are
relatively more likely to abstain than republicans.48
47Recall that in any given year t ∈ {1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,1992, 1996, 2000}, the distributions
of the citizens’ costs of abstaining in the presidential and congressional elections are characterized by the
parametrs (µ1,µ 2,σ)t.
48Note that in standard spatial models of voting (e.g., Downs (1957), Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968)), abstention typically arises either out of “indiﬀerence” (when the two candidates are
equally distant from a citizen’s ideal point), or out of “alienation” (when they are both too distant from a
24The pivotal voter model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) also generates a positive
relationship between information and turnout. They consider an environment with asym-
metric information where some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable
that aﬀects the utility of all voters. Their analysis shows that uninformed voters may strictly
prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when they are not indiﬀerent
between the two candidates and voting is costless. In their model, voters condition their
actions not only on their information, but also on what they can infer about the state of the
world in the event their vote is pivotal. Hence, it may be an equilibrium for the uninformed
voters to abstain and to let the informed voters decide the electoral outcome.49 Although the
two models are very diﬀerent, both in our analysis and in that of Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
voters take into account the consequence of voting for the “wrong” candidate, and this may
lead to abstention.
Palfrey and Poole (1987) develop an index of voter information and ﬁnd it is signiﬁcantly
related to ideological extremism and voting behavior in presidential elections.50 In particular,
they ﬁnd that individuals with a high level of information tend to be more extreme than
those with low levels and are much more likely to vote. Both of these ﬁndings are consistent
with our empirical results.
6.4 Split-Ticket Voting
Our analysis allows us to estimate the probability sincere citizens split their vote in pres-
idential and congressional elections. Hence, we can assess empirically the extent to which
the split-ticket voting observed in the data can be explained by sincere voting. For each
o ft h ee i g h tp r e s i d e n t i a le l e c t i o ny e a r sw ec o n s i d e r ,i nT a b l e1 1w ec o m p a r et h ea m o u n to f
split-ticket voting observed in the data (i.e., the percentage of voters who split their vote
conditional on voting in both elections), to the one predicted by the estimated model, both at
the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation. In Table 12, we then decompose split-ticket
citizen’s ideal point). This is not the case in our model. Also note that explanations of abstention based on
indiﬃrence and/or alienation are typically not supported by the data (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1984)).
49See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999).
50Their index of voter information in the 1980 presidential election is based on NES data about voter
perceptions of candidates’ positions on several issues measured on a 7-point scale.
25v o t i n g ,b yr e p o r t i n gt h ep r o p o r t i o no fs p l i t - t i c k e tv o t e r sw h oa r es i n c e r ea n dc o n t r a r i a n ,
respectively.
Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from these tables. As we can see from Table 11, the
estimated model accurately predicts split-ticket voting in each presidential election year both
at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation, and captures the aggregate downward
trend observed in the data. Consistent with what we observe, our analysis implies that
independents are always relatively more likely to split their vote than partisans, but no clear
pattern emerges in the comparison between democrats and republicans.
T u r n i n gt oT a b l e1 2 ,w eﬁnd that sincere voting can only account for a relatively small
percentage of observed split-ticket voting in each presidential election year. During our
sample period, our estimated model implies that, on average, sincere voters account for only
about 22% of the overall population of split-ticket voters (about 20%, 22% and 28% among
democrats, republicans and independents, respectively). The extent of split-ticket voting by
sincere citizens, however, is substantially higher in the later part of the sample (1988-2000)
than in earlier years (1972-1984), both at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation.51
Overall, we conclude that sincere voting alone cannot explain split-ticket voting. Other
considerations, like perhaps the desire to “balance” the government as suggested by Alesina
and Rosenthal (1996), or the existence of budgetary externalities within a federal system as
suggested by Chari, Jones and Marimon (1999), play an important role in citizens’ decisions
to split their vote in presidential and congressional elections.
For each presidential election year, in Figure 3 we plot the estimated aggregate dis-
tribution of split-ticket voters on the liberal-conservative ideological space, relative to the
distribution of citizens’ positions (that is, each picture depicts the density of citizens’ posi-
tions and the fraction of split-ticket voters for each ideological position in a given year). As
we can see from this ﬁgure, the distribution of split-ticket voters in any presidential election
year has three modes, denoting that citizens whose ideological positions are relatively ex-
treme on either side of the liberal-conservative space, and citizens with “middle-of-the-road”
positions, are more likely to split their vote. Interestingly, our estimates imply that sincere
51It will be interesting to see whether our 2000 estimate represents the beginning of another “regime” that
may persist over time, or simply be due to some speciﬁc circumsatnces of the 2000 election.
26split-ticket voters account for the mass in the middle, while contrarian split-ticket voters are
in the tails of the distribution.
To summarize, our ﬁndings indicate that there are two types of split-ticket voters in each
presidential election year: contrarian split-ticket voters with relatively extreme ideological
positions, and sincere split-ticket voters with relatively moderate positions. Furthermore,
sincere voters account for a small minority of all split-ticket voters in any given year. It is
interesting to relate our empirical ﬁndings to Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) balancing theory
of split-ticket voting, where the desire of citizens with relatively moderate positions to induce
the government to adopt moderate policies, leads them to strategically split their vote in
presidential and congressional elections. In contrast, we ﬁnd that split-ticket voting may be
the natural (sincere) choice for citizens with relatively moderate positions.
We conclude this section by investigating the relationship between information and split-
ticket voting. For each of the eight presidential election years we consider, in Table 13 we
report the estimated proportion of informed and uninformed citizens who, conditional on
voting in both elections, split their vote in presidential and congressional elections. We
ﬁnd that, by and large, uninformed voters are more likely to split their vote than informed
voters. This ﬁnding is somewhat consistent with the results of Palfrey and Poole (1987),
who ﬁnd that the voting behavior of uninformed voters in presidential elections exhibits more
(apparent) randomness and is therefore less predictable than that of informed voters.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
An appealing feature of our approach is that we can use the estimated model to evaluate the
eﬀects of various counterfactual experiments on citizens’ participation and voting decisions
in presidential and congressional elections, and on the electoral outcomes they induce. Here,
we consider three experiments where we analyze the outcomes of presidential and congres-
sional elections for each of the presidential election years in our sample period, under three
hypothetical scenarios where: (i) all citizens are sincere; (ii) all citizens are informed; and
(iii) all citizens vote.52
52Using the notation of our model, the three experiments correspond to situations where for all citizens
(i) πs =0 ; (ii) πλ =1 ; and (iii) θP = θH =+ ∞, respectively.
27The results of these experiments are reported in Table 14, where for each year, entries
in bold denote either the actual winner of the presidential election (column 2) or the party
who actually obtained the majority of the House of representatives (column 3), and entries
who are underlined denote the electoral outcomes implied by the experiments.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, had all citizens behaved sincerely
in each of the presidential election years we consider, our analysis predicts that we would
have observed fewer instances of divided government.53 This ﬁnding is consistent with our
previous result that most split-ticket voting is due to contrarian voters. Hence, if all citizens
were to behave sincerely, relatively fewer citizens would split their vote, and the same party
would be more likely to win both in the presidential and the congressional elections.
Second, similar results (although not necessarily in the same elections and for the same
years) obtain if all citizens are informed or if nobody abstains. Again, the intuition for these
ﬁndings is provided by our previous results. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of an exogenous increase
in information (i.e., the experiment where all citizens are informed). Since informed citizens
are relatively less likely to split their ticket (see Table 13), relatively fewer citizens will split
their vote, and hence the same party will be more likely to win both in the presidential
and the congressional elections. There is, however, another eﬀect due to the fact that in-
formed citizens are also more likely to vote. The overall result will therefore depend on the
relative magnitudes of the eﬀects of information on the behavior of citizens with diﬀerent de-
mographic characteristics, ideological positions and party identiﬁcation, and will in general
diﬀer over time.
Consider now the eﬀect of an exogenous increase in turnout (i.e., the experiment where all
citizens vote). Since by deﬁnition only sincere citizens may abstain, eliminating abstention
will increase the proportion of sincere voters and hence decrease the amount of split-ticket
voting relative to other voting proﬁles. At the same time, however, eliminating abstention
will also increase the proportion of uninformed voters, who are more likely to split their vote.
53According to our estimated model, the Republican party would have gained control of the House in 1972
and 1984, while the Democratic party would have preserved its control of the House during Clinton’s second
term in oﬃce. However, our analysis also predicts that Gore would have won the presidency in the 2000
election, but without changing the Republican predominance in the House.
28Thus, the overall result will once again depend on the relative sizes of the diﬀerent eﬀects,
which will in general diﬀer across diﬀerent years.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Understanding citizens’ electoral behavior represents a fundamental step in the analysis of
democratic institutions. In this paper, we have addressed a simple, yet important, question
about observed patterns of participation and voting in U.S. national elections: Do citizens
vote sincerely? Or in other words, to what extent can sincere voting account for what we see
in the data? To address this question we have proposed a uniﬁed model of turnout and voting
in presidential and congressional elections with heterogenous voters, based on the notion that
citizens minimize their expected regret. We have estimated the model using individual-level
data for each U.S. presidential election year form 1972 to 2000. We have found that in every
presidential election year a non-negligible fraction of the American electorate does not vote
sincerely, and only a relatively small fraction of observed split-ticket voting can be explained
by sincere voting.
Our empirical analysis has also allowed us to investigate the evolution of the distribu-
tion of citizens’ ideological positions and their information about electoral candidates over
time. We have found a systematic, positive relationship between information and turnout.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings indicate that the American electorate has become relatively more
polarized over time.
It is important to observe that we have deliberately chosen to keep our model of the
behavior of sincere citizens extremely simple. In fact, consistent with the primary goal of
our analysis, we have “stacked the deck” against sincere voting by focusing solely on the
extent to which diﬀerences in ideological preferences and information can explain observed
diﬀerences in turnout and voting in presidential and congressional elections. Clearly, other
factors like, for example, diﬀerences in candidates’ competence, citizens’ preferences over
candidates’ personal traits (e.g., charisma), or candidates’ positions on policy dimensions
other than the liberal-conservative one, may play an important role in explaining the data
and may very well account for what we have labelled as “contrarian” behavior. We plan to
explore these issues in future work.
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34Table 1 : Electoral outcomes 
Presidential Congressional Year 
Election    Elections 
1972  McGovern  v  Nixon  D  v R 
1976  Carter  v  Ford  D  v R 
1980 Carter    v  Reagan  D  v R 
1984 Mondale    v   Reagan  D  v R 
1988  Dukakis  v  Bush Sr.  D  v R 
1992  Clinton  v Bush Sr.  D  v R 
1996  Clinton  v  Dole  D  v R 
2000  Gore  v  Bush Jr.  D  v R 
 
 
Table 2: Sample distributions of voting profiles 
Voting 
Profiles 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 
AA  26.68% 28.07% 31.76% 27.43% 31.12% 29.52% 26.50% 27.46%
AD  0.98% 0.15% 0.34% 0.07% 0.18% 0.13% 0.17% 0.00%
AR  0.31% 0.15% 0.11% 0.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.68% 0.10%
DA  1.96% 3.14% 1.91% 2.35% 1.89% 4.25% 2.65% 4.92%
RA  3.43% 2.27% 1.35% 2.63% 2.97% 2.81% 1.11% 3.94%
DD  20.69% 25.73% 19.48% 23.03% 26.17% 30.70% 30.43% 28.84%
DR  3.49% 6.58% 6.19% 4.05% 3.51% 6.21% 8.72% 5.61%
RD  14.01% 9.87%  10.92% 12.15% 9.71% 7.25% 2.74% 4.23%
RR  28.46% 24.05% 27.93% 28.00% 24.46% 19.14% 27.01% 24.90%
 
 
Table 3: Sample averages 
Year Age Black  Lowedu Highedu Female Lowinc Dem Rep  Ind 
1972 44.3 0.07 0.36 0.15 0.56 0.61 0.48 0.40 0.12 
1976 46.0 0.08 0.29 0.16 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.36 0.14 
1980 44.7 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.38 0.14 
1984 43.3 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.11 
1988 44.6 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.55 0.56 0.45 0.43 0.12 
1992 45.7 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.54 0.61 0.51 0.37 0.12 
1996 48.0 0.10 0.13 0.29 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.40 0.08 
















Table 4: Candidates’ positions 
House: Northeast  House: Midwest  House: West  House: South 
Year President 
Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. 
Democratic candidates 
1972 -0.521 -0.388 0.128 -0.372 0.138 -0.403 0.150 -0.090 0.208 
1976 -0.510 -0.373 0.131 -0.345 0.162 -0.360 0.198 -0.106 0.207 
1980 -0.510 -0.367 0.129 -0.350 0.165 -0.391 0.198 -0.103 0.212 
1984 -0.488 -0.357 0.115 -0.339 0.160 -0.399 0.126 -0.137 0.177 
1988 -0.494 -0.362 0.113 -0.326 0.159 -0.386 0.142 -0.146 0.160 
1992 -0.456 -0.364 0.120 -0.301 0.163 -0.375 0.141 -0.209 0.177 
1996 -0.456 -0.376 0.107 -0.334 0.145 -0.398 0.130 -0.269 0.164 
2000 -0.290 -0.363 0.105 -0.330 0.138 -0.364 0.123 -0.255 0.147 
Republican candidates 
1972 0.388 0.148 0.129 0.284 0.157 0.276 0.160 0.312 0.117 
1976 0.358 0.125 0.153 0.269 0.137 0.361 0.170 0.324 0.130 
1980 0.568 0.163 0.160 0.314 0.144 0.402 0.153 0.373 0.131 
1984 0.568 0.202 0.170 0.319 0.112 0.432 0.121 0.385 0.092 
1988 0.546 0.206 0.169 0.325 0.125 0.435 0.132 0.384 0.114 
1992 0.546 0.238 0.122 0.372 0.121 0.448 0.111 0.402 0.111 
1996 0.331 0.263 0.122 0.398 0.117 0.443 0.123 0.429 0.119 
2000 0.399 0.257 0.112 0.382 0.121 0.448 0.140 0.409 0.113 
  
Table 5 : Maximum-likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 
φ 
estimate  std. err.   estimate  std. err.  estimate  std. err.  estimate std. err.  estimate std. err.  estimate std. err.  estimate  std. err. estimate std.  err. 
α1  1.306 0.257  1.326 0.262 1.303 0.198 1.152 0.288 1.669 0.307 2.504 0.214 1.399 0.241 2.681 0.230
α2  1.747 0.195  1.906 0.339 2.678 0.294 2.285 0.248 3.230 0.205 3.056 0.245 2.126 0.221 2.456 0.307
α3  1.688 0.210  1.869 0.264 2.746 0.249 2.579 0.264 2.594 0.383 2.499 0.235 2.106 0.258 3.863 0.430
α4  0.037 0.133  0.080 0.130 0.004 0.080 0.214 0.135 0.022 0.118 -0.057 0.092  -0.145 0.131 0.243 0.103
α5  -0.362 0.109 -0.094 0.083  -0.151 0.100 -0.337 0.094 -0.158 0.086 -0.086 0.047  -0.196 0.082 -0.346 0.074
α6  0.000 0.055 -0.058 0.053  -0.044 0.058 -0.157 0.061 0.069 0.050 0.078 0.038  -0.051 0.066 0.019 0.058
α7  -0.056 0.071  0.049 0.064 0.019 0.067 -0.075 0.059 -0.004 0.041 0.000 0.046  -0.040 0.053 -0.088 0.043
α8  -0.048 0.045  0.085 0.043  -0.051 0.047 -0.056 0.044 -0.028 0.036 0.032 0.028  -0.038 0.043 -0.064 0.035
α9  -0.072 0.052  0.043 0.048  -0.126 0.049 -0.114 0.048 -0.053 0.040 0.009 0.027 0.084 0.049 -0.062 0.040
β1  1.821 0.217  2.057 0.221 1.708 0.166 1.645 0.225 2.200 0.261 3.008 0.193 2.111 0.195 2.978 0.198
β2  0.826 0.253  1.383 0.417 1.943 0.355 1.434 0.304 2.710 0.208 2.587 0.256 1.401 0.267 1.848 0.350
β3  1.323 0.219  1.835 0.273 2.379 0.250 2.242 0.260 2.679 0.342 2.694 0.227 2.092 0.251 3.767 0.427
γ1  -0.539 0.399 -1.461 0.428  -3.397 0.658 -1.365 0.441 -2.765 0.568 -1.002 0.304  -3.734 0.713 -1.652 0.414
γ2  -0.545 0.455 -1.237 0.573  -2.073 0.622 -1.849 0.526 -1.850 0.403 -1.204 0.294  -2.423 0.610 -2.812 0.525
γ3  -1.682 0.551 -1.984 0.496  -3.189 0.705 -1.596 0.372 -2.719 0.483 -2.186 0.347  -3.967 0.784 -2.687 0.436
γ4  2.921 0.693  4.641 0.737 5.917 1.036 4.844 0.735 6.054 0.763 4.312 0.480 7.040 1.119 5.255 0.725
γ5  -1.678 1.276 -0.563 0.621  -3.741 2.954 -2.626 1.428 -1.295 0.829 -0.209 0.284  -1.332 1.031 -1.420 0.766
γ6  -1.274 0.309 -1.391 0.315  -3.010 1.035 -1.983 0.378 -1.761 0.382 -1.649 0.231  -4.573 1.884 -1.636 0.409
γ7  0.984 0.303  1.153 0.315 1.187 0.409 0.962 0.277 1.651 0.301 0.971 0.197 1.022 0.340 1.281 0.253
γ8  -0.044 0.229 -0.499 0.226 0.319 0.342 0.231 0.210 0.312 0.238 0.245 0.155 0.196 0.330 -0.121 0.217
γ9  -1.470 0.259 -0.919 0.268  -0.701 0.343 -1.070 0.237 -1.017 0.238 -0.730 0.169  -1.604 0.390 -1.027 0.235
δ1  -2.196 0.486 -4.866 1.244  -4.822 2.210 -3.933 1.063 -6.260 3.548 -9.725 4.012  -7.141 2.261 -4.003 1.042
δ2  -2.428 1.015 -7.037 2.221  -7.498 4.123 -4.743 1.790 -8.559 6.033 -19.058 9.429  -9.535 3.685 -4.192 3.211
δ3  -5.159 1.871 -4.302 1.824  -12.043  14.711 -7.034 2.099 -8.025 2.301 -9.149 3.386  -4.572 1.693 -4.354 1.885
δ4  5.921 2.728  5.845 3.291  21.487  28.233 10.508 3.548 17.401 6.145 20.329 9.208 4.605 3.093 5.561 3.677
δ5  -4.745 1.590 -5.280 2.032  -13.783  11.084 -9.985 4.104 -2.892 1.433 -8.387 3.436  -4.262 2.072 -2.042 0.414
δ6  9.389 3.499 15.506 7.277  37.600  31.620 25.703 11.340 -8.890 5.295 -23.915 10.698  -8.866 5.677 -1.252 4.604
δ7  -1.538 0.263  0.194 0.218 0.241 0.250 0.246 0.234 0.267 0.359 1.271 0.349 2.768 0.526 0.380 0.519
δ8  1.470 0.311  0.666 0.305 1.886 0.475 2.892 0.473 1.371 0.343 0.925 0.293  -1.804 0.674 1.531 0.492
δ9  1.226 0.427  0.317 0.393 1.407 0.664 2.101 0.748 -3.068 1.452 -0.125 0.524 5.697 8.912 -1.260 1.202
µ1  -5.401 0.013 -4.558 0.785  -3.955 0.044 -5.365 0.051 -4.617 0.941 -4.637 0.253  -4.785 0.584 -3.819 0.032
µ2  -3.553 0.012 -3.544 0.042  -3.207 0.068 -3.762 0.083 -3.499 0.042 -3.718 0.066  -3.437 0.067 -3.092 0.082
σ  0.033 1.409  0.229 1.306 0.143 1.346 0.172 1.448 0.249 1.155 0.356 1.134 0.305 1.180 0.042 2.007 
Table 6 : Distributions of voting profiles and goodness-of-fit-tests 
Voting  1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 
profiles  Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data 
All 
AA  25.74% 26.68% 27.13% 28.07% 30.54% 31.76% 26.04% 27.43% 29.69% 31.12% 28.52% 29.52% 25.11% 26.50% 26.05% 27.46%
AD  0.98% 0.98% 0.35% 0.15% 0.18% 0.34% 0.32% 0.07% 0.17% 0.18% 0.17% 0.13% 0.45% 0.17% 0.24% 0.00%
AR  0.44% 0.31% 0.18% 0.15% 0.36% 0.11% 0.36% 0.28% 0.17% 0.00% 0.17% 0.00% 0.44% 0.68% 0.26% 0.10%
DA  1.73% 1.96% 2.85% 3.14% 1.35% 1.91% 2.15% 2.35% 2.40% 1.89% 4.00% 4.25% 2.22% 2.65% 4.68% 4.92%
RA  4.35% 3.43% 2.71% 2.27% 2.24% 1.35% 3.32% 2.63% 3.42% 2.97% 4.10% 2.81% 1.80% 1.11% 4.35% 3.94%
DD  21.39% 20.69% 26.05% 25.73% 20.28% 19.48% 23.69% 23.03% 26.16% 26.17% 31.28% 30.70% 30.75% 30.43% 29.76% 28.84%
DR  3.28% 3.49% 6.48% 6.58% 6.17% 6.19% 4.04% 4.05% 3.56% 3.51% 5.98% 6.21% 8.58% 8.72% 6.17% 5.61%
RD  13.49% 14.01% 10.08%  9.87% 11.20% 10.92% 11.80% 12.15% 9.39% 9.71% 6.98% 7.25%  3.91%  2.74% 4.05% 4.23%
RR  28.60% 28.46% 24.17% 24.05% 27.66% 27.93% 28.27% 28.00% 25.03% 24.46% 18.81% 19.14% 26.75% 27.01% 24.44% 24.90%
χ
2
(8)  5.85 3.68 8.65 6.75 4.81 10.26  12.82 5.74 
p-value  0.6640 0.8847 0.3727 0.5638 0.7777 0.2472 0.1182 0.6763 
 Democrats 
AA  25.85% 27.32% 26.45% 26.96% 32.07% 32.39% 24.20% 26.56% 30.11% 31.49% 24.82% 25.03% 26.03% 27.50% 25.15% 25.19%
AD  1.29% 1.78% 0.06% 0.00% 0.30% 0.70% 0.29% 0.15% 0.15% 0.20% 0.19% 0.13% 0.67% 0.16% 0.05% 0.00%
AR  0.64% 0.25% 0.31% 0.14% 0.43% 0.23% 0.52% 0.15% 0.14% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.17% 0.00% 0.34% 0.00%
DA  2.81% 3.05% 4.19% 4.49% 2.31% 3.05% 3.77% 3.49% 4.26% 3.17% 6.58% 6.90% 3.62% 4.58% 7.44% 8.14%
RA  4.25% 2.54% 1.59% 1.74% 1.24% 0.70% 1.68% 1.21% 0.75% 0.59% 0.90% 0.64% 0.44% 0.00% 0.98% 1.16%
DD  39.05% 37.61% 44.88% 44.78% 38.20% 37.09% 46.28% 45.68% 50.85% 51.09% 54.11% 53.64% 53.32% 52.86% 52.60% 52.13%
DR  3.76% 4.19% 8.04% 8.41% 9.87%  10.09% 7.35% 7.59% 4.99% 5.15% 7.88% 8.30%  11.22%  11.29% 7.59% 7.56%
RD  14.72%  15.63% 8.56% 8.12% 7.83% 7.75% 6.68% 6.83% 4.72% 4.95% 3.12% 3.32% 2.33% 1.15% 1.43% 1.36%
RR  7.62% 7.62% 5.91% 5.36% 7.74% 7.98% 9.22% 8.35% 4.03% 3.37% 2.34% 2.04% 2.20% 2.45% 4.41% 4.46%
χ
2
(8)  10.76  1.95 4.83 5.36 3.34 2.02  12.04  2.57 
p-value  0.2157 0.7756 0.7756 0.7185 0.9112 0.9804 0.1494 0.9584 
Republicans 
AA  18.67% 18.24% 19.87% 20.73% 18.26% 20.90% 21.58% 21.75% 23.50% 24.01% 24.05% 26.14% 16.83% 18.36% 18.27% 21.03%
AD  0.34% 0.00% 0.37% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.22% 0.21% 0.13% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.29% 0.00%
AR  0.24% 0.15% 0.06% 0.20% 0.25% 0.00% 0.23% 0.51% 0.15% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 0.39% 1.30% 0.03% 0.00%
DA  0.37% 1.08% 0.65% 1.22% 0.25% 0.30% 0.44% 1.01% 0.46% 0.42% 0.73% 0.70% 0.50% 0.43% 0.81% 1.03%
RA  4.24% 4.64% 4.27% 3.25% 2.90% 1.49% 5.08% 4.22% 4.93% 5.01% 8.53% 5.61% 3.49% 2.38% 8.16% 7.18%
DD  3.71% 3.55% 4.77% 4.07% 3.01% 2.39% 2.53% 1.69% 3.10% 3.97% 4.61% 4.39% 4.92% 4.97% 5.04% 3.33%
DR  2.62% 2.47% 4.55% 4.27% 2.57% 2.69% 1.01% 0.84% 2.62% 2.30% 3.57% 3.33% 5.66% 5.83% 4.06% 3.08%
RD  12.29% 12.36% 11.68% 11.99% 15.26% 14.33% 17.19% 17.71% 14.08% 13.36% 12.67% 12.81%  6.13%  4.54% 8.26% 8.72%
RR  57.52% 57.50% 53.78% 54.27% 57.48% 57.91% 51.73% 52.28% 50.95% 50.73% 45.52% 47.02% 61.99% 62.20% 55.08% 55.64%
χ
2
(8)  11.49 7.99 5.15 10.29 2.33  8.94 14.65 6.89 
p-value  0.1754 0.4344 0.7414 0.2452 0.9692 0.3474 0.0663 0.5485 
Independents 
AA  48.16% 51.50% 48.86% 51.61% 57.82% 58.27% 50.92% 52.90% 51.19% 56.25% 59.15% 60.11% 59.19% 59.38% 57.88% 60.91%
AD  1.87% 1.00% 1.34% 1.08% 0.21% 0.00% 0.92% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.19% 0.56% 0.70% 1.04% 0.91% 0.00%
AR  0.32% 1.00% 0.05% 0.00% 0.42% 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.34% 0.00% 0.56% 0.00% 2.40% 2.08% 0.71% 0.91%
DA  1.85% 0.50% 3.69% 3.23% 1.06% 2.36% 1.74% 2.58% 2.35% 2.34% 3.09% 3.93% 1.63% 1.04% 5.41% 3.64%
RA  5.06% 3.00% 2.75% 1.61% 3.87% 3.15% 3.54% 2.58% 8.33% 4.69% 4.04% 3.37% 2.29% 2.08% 6.64% 5.45%
DD  9.09% 9.50%  12.49%  12.37% 5.73% 5.51% 8.62% 8.39% 15.09% 10.94% 16.23% 14.04%  11.62%  10.42% 10.26% 10.00%
DR  3.55% 4.00% 5.79% 5.91% 3.28% 2.36% 1.58% 1.29% 1.46% 1.56% 5.29% 6.18% 5.90% 6.25% 6.96% 5.45%
RD  12.51% 13.00% 11.48% 10.75% 11.76% 12.60% 13.01% 13.55% 10.27% 14.84% 5.73% 6.74%  3.26%  4.17% 1.45% 1.82%
RR  17.59% 16.50% 13.55% 13.44% 15.86% 15.75% 19.52% 18.71% 10.84% 9.38% 5.74% 5.06% 13.01% 13.54% 9.78% 11.82%
χ
2
(8)  8.06 1.56 3.42 2.99 7.59 4.22 0.82 3.04 
p-value  0.4276 0.9917 0.9053 0.9349 0.4745 0.8367 0.9991 0.9318  
Table 7:  Proportions of informed citizens 
Year All  Democrats Republicans Independents 
1972 37%  36%  45%  17% 
1976 43%  39%  55%  28% 
1980 35%  23%  56%  21% 
1984 44%  45%  46%  36% 
1988 47%  37%  63%  33% 
1992 57%  59%  62%  28% 
1996 38%  25%  59%  18% 
2000 46%  53%  41%  27% 
 
 
Table 8: Proportions of sincere citizens 
Year All  Democrats Republicans Independents 
1972 82%  79%  85%  83% 
1976 85%  85%  86%  83% 
1980 85%  83%  86%  88% 
1984 85%  87%  87%  88% 
1988 89%  92%  88%  83% 
1992 90%  91%  88%  89% 
1996 90%  88%  93%  92% 
2000 93%  95%  90%  89% 
 
 
Table 9: Proportions of contrarian voters 
All Democrats    Republicans  Independents 
Year 
P H  P H  P  H  P  H 
1972  13%  11%  24%  6%  3%  14% 8% 29% 
1976  8% 13% 9% 12%  6%  12%  15%  22% 
1980  7%  16%  11%  15%  2%  15% 6% 25% 
1984  5% 17% 8% 11%  1%  22%  3%  25% 
1988  6%  10%  5%  7% 3% 13% 33%  2% 
1992  4% 12% 3% 10%  5%  13%  14%  15% 
1996  4% 10% 1% 16%  7%  1%  0%  22% 
2000  4%  8% 2%  4% 2% 12% 21%  8% 
 
 
Table 10: Abstension probabilities 
Abstain for President  Abstain for Congress  Abstain in both elections 
Year 
Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed  Uninformed 
1972  0.00% 42.49% 2.14% 48.78% 0.00%  40.29% 
1976  0.00% 47.67% 2.82% 54.47% 0.00%  46.76% 
1980  0.00% 46.36% 1.82% 50.18% 0.00%  45.56% 
1984  0.00% 47.98% 2.25% 54.86% 0.00%  46.73% 
1988  0.00% 58.26% 2.79% 65.99% 0.00%  57.54% 
1992  0.00% 64.80% 4.83% 77.23% 0.00%  64.05% 
1996  0.00% 41.94% 1.68% 46.12% 0.00%  40.58% 
2000  0.00% 50.51% 0.41% 66.04% 0.00%  49.62% Table 11: Split-ticket voting 
All Democrats  Republicans  Independents 
Year 
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data 
1972 25.12% 26.26% 28.36% 30.47% 19.59% 19.55% 37.58% 39.53% 
1976 24.80% 24.83% 24.63% 24.78% 21.70% 21.80% 39.89% 39.24% 
1980 26.59% 26.55% 27.82% 28.24% 22.77% 22.18% 41.05% 41.30% 
1984 23.37% 23.79% 20.17% 20.97% 25.12% 25.23% 34.14% 33.85% 
1988 20.19% 20.70% 15.04% 15.64% 23.60% 22.25% 31.16% 44.68% 
1992 20.55% 21.26% 16.31% 17.27% 24.47% 23.90% 33.39% 40.35% 
1996 17.85% 16.62% 19.62% 18.36% 14.98% 13.37% 27.12% 30.30% 
2000 15.87% 15.48% 13.66% 13.61% 17.01% 16.67% 29.55% 25.00% 
 
 
Table 12: Distributions of split-ticket voters 
All Democrats  Republicans  Independents 
Year 
Sincere Contrarian Sincere Contrarian Sincere Contrarian Sincere Contrarian
1972 10.89% 89.11% 11.40% 88.60% 11.63% 88.37% 10.89%  0.06% 
1976 16.56% 83.44% 15.37% 84.63% 17.58% 82.42% 18.24% 81.76% 
1980 15.90% 84.10%  9.51%  90.49% 21.76% 78.24% 22.74% 77.26% 
1984 10.41% 89.59% 12.11% 87.89%  6.47%  93.53% 22.23% 77.77% 
1988 26.28% 73.72% 18.91% 81.09% 30.57% 69.43% 27.47% 72.53% 
1992 24.51% 75.49% 21.81% 78.19% 27.38% 72.62% 22.86% 77.14% 
1996 25.50% 74.50% 12.21% 87.79% 44.13% 55.87% 34.96% 65.04% 
2000 42.26% 57.74% 59.91% 40.09% 19.83% 80.17% 70.00% 30.00% 
 
 
Table 13: Split-ticket voting by information status 
Split-ticket voting  
Year 
Informed Uninformed 
1972  22.79% 28.09% 
1976  22.46% 29.49% 
1980  23.44% 29.60% 
1984  19.38% 31.01% 
1988  18.63% 26.49% 
1992  17.02% 42.33% 
1996  18.66% 17.21% 
2000  16.28% 15.45% 
 
                   
Table 14: Counterfactual experiments 
All citizens sincere  All citizens informed  All citizens vote 
Year 
P  H  P  H  P  H 
1972  McGovern  v  Nixon  D  v R  McGovern  v  Nixon  D  v R  McGovern  v  Nixon  D  v R 
1976  Carter  v  Ford D   v R Carter   v  Ford D   v R Carter  v  Ford D   v R 
1980 Carter    v  Reagan  D  v R  Carter  v Reagan  D  v R  Carter  v Reagan  D  v R 
1984 Mondale    v   Reagan  D  v R  Mondale  v  Reagan  D  v R  Mondale  v  Reagan  D  v R 
1988  Dukakis  v  Bush Sr.  D  v R  Dukakis  v  Bush Sr.  D  v R  Dukakis  v  Bush Sr.  D  v R 
1992  Clinton  v Bush Sr. D   v R Clinton  v Bush Sr. D   v R Clinton  v Bush Sr. D   v R 
1996  Clinton  v  Dole  D  v R  Clinton  v  Dole  D v R  Clinton  v  Dole  D v R 
2000 Gore   v  Bush Jr. D    v  R Gore   v  Bush Jr. D  v R Gore   v  Bush Jr. D    v  R 
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    Democrats        Independents      *    Republicans  











-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1























-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
























-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

























-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1











-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
 
 
   All      *   Split-ticket voters 
 